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MILITARY THOUGHT "TheEngagement in the initialay Lieutenant-GeneralReserves L. Skvirskiy
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Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "The Meeting Engagement in the Initial Periody Lieutenant-General of the Reserves L. Skvirskiy.
This article appeared in)1pecial version of the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly. i was sent to press onontained the Table of Contents Tor this issue.
Headquarters Comment; Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthlybile the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET Version was initiated in By tne end of ig6l,ssues of the SECRET version" had baflef theni-
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The Meeting Engagement ia the Initial Periodar
by
Lieutenant-General of the Reserves
L. Skvirskiy
At the present time, as is generally known, the mobile conditions of military operations, stemming froa the very nature of nuclear/missile warfare, are becoming more sharply outlined. Under these conditions, meeting engagements and battles, quite obviously, are becoming almost the predominant type of troop combat operations. But it is right here that one discovers that tbe theory and practice of preparation and conducteeting engagement have been poorly worked out by us. One does not have to look far for examples. It is sufficient to consider tbe course of operational-strategic exercises of recent years, aad to study tbe theoretical works (including those publishedn the problems of the art of operations in order tc be convinced of this.
Strange ms it seems, at the present time we do not have an officially determined definition of the term "meeting engagement". The Field Service Regulations, publishedtate thateeting engagementype of offensive conbat its* which both sides strive tooal by offensive operations". The concepteeting engagement does not fit within tbe framework of this definition. Are the definitionseeting engagement which are found in the theoretical works acceptable, and do they correspond, in principle, to the new nature of nuclear/missile warfare?
To answer these questions, let us examine some of the definitions. In one of the Collections of Works of the General Staff Academy it is stated thateeting engagement can be described as the sub total of combat operations of tbe troops of operational formations and large'units conducted under such conditions when during as operation both sides are striving simultaneously to execute operational tasks by conducting
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offensive operations along the sane axes".
The authors' collective of the MilitaryI. V. Frunze, maintains ln one of its works that "theof both opponents to perform their tasks by using offensive operations will lead inevitablyeries of meeting battles and engagements during an offensive
Marshal of the Armored Troops, P. A. Rotmistrov, points out thateeting engagement represents the sum tbtal of simultaneous or consecutive battles during which bothstrive to attain their objectives by an offensive".
In the pages of our journal Colonel S. M. Kozlov writes: "One musteeting engagement as the clash of the operational groupings of the sides which are mutually striving to achieve their operational aims primarily by means of an offensive."!
Apparently, foreign armies have studied this problem even less than we because foreign literature (we axe speaking here only about that which is known to us) has thrown very little light oa the theory and practiceeeting From official American sources2 it Is known that the meeting engagement pertains to offensive operations under mobile conditions and is definedlash of formations and large-units of the opposing sides which ln the majority of instances are not completely deployed and are striving to perform their tasks by offensive operations on the very same axes.
It is easy to observe that all these definitions are similar. The difference is that some authors consider that supposedly the meeting engagement begins from the march and others that it begins only during the conduct of an operation.
1. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryssue 1
2. . Army Field Manual, Moscow, Voyenizdat,
The basic principle thateeting engagement both sides attack each other from opposite directions is held by all authors. At first glance it scorns that this principle is correct and corresponds completely to modern conditions. Moreover, even In the past the essenceeetingwas understoodimilar manner. This can be seen from Andogskiy's monograph The Meeting Engagement, published from Triandafillov's work'The Kature of Operations of Modern Armies, or from prewar articles by Vartoiomeyev, STnlovskiy, Isserscn, and others on the subject of theengagement.
Actually, however, it pains us to state that as aof precisely such an understanding of the essence of the meeting engagement, at operational-tactical exercises conducted ic recent yearsackground of the initial perioduclear/missile war?the same unfortunate errors have been repeated. The two sides usually draw their main groupings into protracted meeting combat operations instead of using the results of nuclear/missile strikes, open.or poorly covered flanks, and often areas not occupied byand then swiftly advancing to the operational depth.
It seems to us that the definitions cited above of tbe meeting engagement on which our command cadres and operational staffs are educated even today guide them to an obligatory deployment of the operational groupings of tbe two sideseeting engagement and to the participation of asumber as possible of divisions in these clashes. As ain practice oae observes that the main forces are drawn away from the performance of the basic tasksodern offensive operation in order to participateank engagement or in the destruction of several advancing enemy divisions.
It is obvious that the definitions which have been citedeeting engagement are not calculated for the conditions of nuclear/missile warfare. For more than five years now we have admitted that meeting engagements will begin and develop much more often than before and that they willormal
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phenomenon, taking precedence over the remaining types of troop combat operations. And yet in defining the term "meeting engagement" we still use anachronisms. Right now when the goal of any offensive operation by ground troops is the destruction of enemy nuclear/missile weapons and aircraft, and the capture cf important operational-strategic areas, the troops mast not be oriented to the ideaeeting engagement is nothing but the sum total of meeting battles or the offensive actions of the operational groupings of the two sides.
uggest the following definition. eetingconsists of meeting nuclear/missile strikes and swift offensive thrusts of the operational groupings of both sides during which each side uses the results of its nuclear/misslie strikes to perform important operational-strategic tasks in the given theater of military operations {TVD) or along the operational axis.
Because to attain victory it is cecessary to destroy the enemy's means of mass destruction, the main factor in the suggested definition of the meeting engagement are the nuclear/missile strikes of both sides. Successful results of these strikes canaximum loss oa the enemy and force him to abandon the offensive, even long before the direct clash of the fcrrard detachments. This comprises the basic distinguishing featiere of the meeting engagement of the future. Thefinltion does not refute bit rather stresses the possibilitylisfa between large units of tho strikeof the opponents. The encounters will occur mostat the very outset of the engagement the nuclear/ missile strikes do notadical change in the balance of forces and, thus, ir- the situationhole. When we speak cf swift offensive operations, we give preference to the troop maneuver immediately following nuclear strikes,that is, an advance primarily at the speedarch, and not to deployment an3 attack.
A modern meeting engagement does not necessarily start with combat between reconnaissance subunits, forward detachments,
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and advance guards as before, although all these organs must be detached and are actively engaged, but,ule, by meeting nuclear/misslie and aviation strikes. Here,of tbe majority of large units and units of the opponentsirect encounter between them may not even take place. It Is Interesting to clarifyeeting engagement takes place In this instance. We answer this question in the affirmative. eeting engagement occurs because the basic fire and strike forces and weapons of both sides participate in It. It Is not at all obligatory to deploy large formations and large units for an engagement or battle. If the nuclear/ missile weapons of the opponents entered the operation and performed their missions, then it is up to the armies and divisions of the front towift thrust against the enemy flank and rear in order to use the results of nuclear/ missile strikes, and to complete the enemy's destruction. In our opinion, only during this maneuver it may possibly become necessary to deploy part of the fcrces to attack from the march and destroynemy. Such ar. outcome of aengagement will be most typical although in the past most frequently cae of the sides passed to the defensive.
Tha capabilities of the nuclear/missile weapons are so great that Shay have ledejection of position defense {pcxiiaio&Lay'a oborosa) asd cccaequastlf have canceled the needeliberate breakthrough. Massed nuclear/missile strikes delivered simultaneously along the entire depth of the operatioaal-strategic formation of the enemy create conditions for the bagisxingesting engagement. An increase in Iixepower, the strike force, and in the mobility of modern troops is conducive to the beginning of meeting battles and engagements andignificant degree guarantees freedom ln the selection of maneuver for each side.
How there is every reason to consider that not only offensive operations but also modern defensive ones, by the
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aim of the troop operation, have mainly an active nature by their form. In other words, the fundamental change in the method of waging defense is objectively creating favorable conditions for the beginningeeting engagement which will occur much more often than before.
The goaleeting engagement is the destruction of the specific advancing enemy grouping and the seizure of the important operational-strategic area being covered by it in the least amount of time. This Is achieved nainly by massed nuclear/missile strikeskillful maneuver by the strike grouping. The destruction of one definite opposing enemy grouping on the way to achieving the general goal of the whole operationeetingery important part of the offensive operationront or army and not at all an "episode".
Meeting engagements during the initial periodar are distinguished by some special features. The first of these is that these engagements most likely will beby strong groupings intended to wage offensiveand created even before the beginning of the war. This givesasis to suppose that aa offensive operation will begin with meeting engagements which willecisive nature, and their results canignificant influence on the whole subsequent course of armed combat in the theater of military operations. Oa some axes, after having destroyed tne eneay. with nuclear/missile strikes in the border zone
, tho flrst ncurs and days of the war, our troops will quickly carry the combat operations to the operational depth, out on other axes these engagements may be dragged out or even proceed unfavorably for our troops.
The second special feature of meeting engagements is that touperiority in the balance of forceshange in the situation ln our favor, there will have to be additional efforts by nuclear/misslie weapons andaad,egrouping of part of the forces and weapons of the front. The meeting engagements conducted accordingingle plan simultaneously or consecutively
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on several axes in the zone of the offensive of the front with unavoidable large gaps between operational formations and large units will demand great efforts and mobility ln supporting troop combat operations which are coordinated according to their time, space, and aim, and undoubtedly they will be conducted most often on the scaleront.
Tbe statement that the scaleeeting engagement Is limited to an army Is current even now although historical experience and tbe practice of recent operational-strategic exercises do not confirm this. Quite tbe opposite, the theory and practice of today and historical experience show quite obviously that the scopeeeting engagement has expanded. These engagements may beront as well as by an army. It Is Important to stress also the increase ln the spatial scopeeeting engagementtbe width of the zone and particularly of the depth of conductingoperations. Although formerly the deptheeting, engagement was determined by the operational formationiven specific grouping and was.measured usually by the location of the second echelons and reserves, at present It is determined by the distance of the missile troop groupings.
The fast speed of an offensiveeetingIs assuming special meaning now when the time forstrikes and other operations Is calculated in hours and minutes.
It is quite clear that it is difficult to make fixed estimates regarding speedeeting engagement. However, experience gained from exercises indicator that speedsm and over4 hour period are feasible for modern troops. The decisive defeat of the enemy by nuclear/misslie weapons and the high mobility of formations and large unitseeting engagement to be waged at the fastest speeds.onsiderable degree, the latter depend on reliable aerial cover and, primarily, on combatting successfully the enemy's missile weapons. Here, one should bear in mind thatand obstacles resulting from the use of nuclear weapons and especially areas with high levels of radiation can slow down the troop progress.
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As for the time factor, It should be expected that the periods of time duringeeting encounter may start, proceed, and reach an end will be shortened considerably+
Another special feature is that meeting engagements may take place not only at the beginning of an operation but also during the fulfilment of an immediate ormission of the front, in the process of destroying the first enemy operational echelon, orwift advance into the operationalnder the most diverse conditions. This will consist of nuclear/missile surprise counterstrikes (vstrechnyy udar) and encounters between the forward moving groupings of both sides making up the complement of the front (armies) and the enemy operational reserves approaching from the depth.
One can easily be convinced of this after studying the materials based on our operational-strategic exercises90 and the exercises of NATO troops ofyears. According to the known views of the enemy regarding the early operations during the initial periodar, following sudden massed nuclear strikes strong troop groupings will be moved forward from the depth in order to deliver strikeseeting engagement.
This happens firstly because, in contrast to the past, the advancing side will have to deal not only with the defender but primarily with the enemy advancing to meet him; secondly, the methods of operations of even the enemy on the defanse are now mainly offensive ones; and finally, thirdly, due tc the use of nuclear/missile weaponsare created which give rise to meeting engagements.
All this leads us to the thoughtew phenomenon in the art of operationsa meeting operation (vstrechnaya opcratsiya). This problem7 on the pages of Voyennaya My si in an article by, Kozlov Previously, however, "Tor some reason it was consideredto plan meeting operations in advance, and the problem passed into oblivion.
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Although previously the aide which suffered defeateeting engagement and passed to the defense could count on being able to halt the enemy advance at least temporarily, now it cannot hope totable front. The side wblch emerged victorious in the first meeting engagement can operate so skillfully and swiftly that it will not give the otherhance to collectand will penetrate into its operational depth before the defeated enemyordsccess. If he is successful in quicklyefenseertain axis, then he may be destroyed by nuclear weapons.
Ve are far from thinking that all the aimsroat will be achieved by Victory (if, of course, one considers that' in the main Theater__Ql military operation, .thev may beepth0 km and more). Evaluating realistically the ways to' develop the first offensive operation, it is easy to become convinced that after victory in the first majorengagement the troops will have several meetings with the enemy ln the depth. The enemy will strive todestruction, change the balance of forces in his favor, and thus seize tbe initiative by using strikes by nuclear/missile weapons, aircraft, by shifting reserves to tbe theater of military operations, and by counterstrIkes by the surviving forces and weapons. The result will be that the troops of tbe front wblch were rushing into the enemy's operational depth will conduct their own combat operationsharp and dynamic situation which demands the constant forestalling of the enemy in the uso of nuclear/missile weapons, in seizing advantageous areas and Important water lines, in deploying part of his forces, and is the constant movement forward of the main forces to occupy vitally important enemy areas to prevent hisresistance.
All that has been said convinces us of the advisability ofeeting offensive operation from the established and conventional understanding connected with an offensiveefending enemy and with aof the defense. Obviously, such an operation in
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the Main theater of Military operations will be more typical for the initial periodar. Now reality itseir and the practice ofcientific working out of the theoryeeting offensive operation.
Such problems as how to choose nuclear/missile weapons, how to choose the axis for the main strike, the role of superiority of forces and weapons over the enemy, the preparationeeting engagement, the creation of troop groupings, and the bases of control are also of definite interest for the practice of operational training.
. e use of nuclear/missile weapons makes it possible to Periora the basic tasks and to influence the whole courseeeting engagementaneuver of even single or tens of nuclear warheads without having to resortaneuverarge amount of artillery, tanks,or formations and large units as-was.the case previously. The necessary amount of nuclear/missilewill depend on the total aim of the operation and the aim of the specific meeting engagement on the given
B:theed by the missile troops of strategic designation in the zone of the frontal
offensive or on the axis of the army's operations, and on
the results achieved by them.
The greatest effectiveness in the use of nuclearcan be achieved In the first sudden massed nuclear strike against the most important enemy objectives and groupings, primarily against his nuclear weapons. This principle was advanced in tho directives on operational training during recent years. Incidentally, at the large exercisehe "southern" forces planned to deliver the first nuclear strike byuclear warheads of whichth* enemy's weapons of massgainst troop groupings,gainst enemy Icontrol points and radiotechnical means. Theotse of nuclear weapons was'confirmed rather quickly. The absence of trustworthy reconnaissance data
before the beginning of combat operations and andisclosure of the enemy's plan led to the result for the "south" thatercent of all the warheads designated for the first nuclear strike against the enemy fell wide of the mark.
This is not an accidental phenomenon. If an analysis is made of effectiveness in the use of nuclear weapons in80 exercises, it will be found that at each of them there wasarge percentage of waste in the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently here we encounter difficulties in preparing for the first meeting offensive operation when neither side is free to choose the methods and means of conducting reconnaissance. It is especially important in the advance planning for andeeting engagement that reconnaissance makes it possible for the front and army command to deliver accurate and preemptive nuclear strikes.
The basic criterion in selecting objectives to benuclear strikes should be their Importance and theof effect they may have on the course of a It ismention here that Instances unsuccessful90 exercises are explained byuse of rzuclear weapons during the engagement. Inuse of nuclear weapons should
Bedeployment of emdmy groupingseeting engagement. Successful massed nuclear strikes against enemy large units aad the destruction of his nuclear/misslieat this moment may sharply change tbe balance of forces and the entire situation.
The organizationassed nuclear strike delivery may be carried out at the beginningeeting engagement more oftenront level, and during the engagement on an army level, especially if one considers the considerable independence of the latter. However, we mus% bear in mind that it is considerably more difficult to organize andassed nuclear strikeeeting engagement
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2 tank armies. The greater part of the General Headquarters reserves was in the process of formation. At the end of May in connection with the sharply worsening situation, the rapid formation was begun ofeserve combined-arms armies.
The combat operations on the Soviet-German front which were developing in and2 in the Crimea and before Kharkov and Lyuban, ended unsuccessfully for our troops. One of the major reasons for this was the scattering of the strategic reservesufficiently decisive concentration of them on only one axis considered by the Supreme High Command to be the main one.
The unsuccessful outcome of the combat operations of May and2 and the shift of our troops to thedefense once againadical re-examination or tne timing and the purposes for committing strategic reserves to battle. Instead of being used to develop an offensive, they were being used for defensive operations, in addition to this, the serious situation which had taken shape compelled the committing to battle of the majority of the newly formed units (combined-arms reserve armies and tank corps) before they were adequately knit together and trained.
The main events of the summer-fall campaign2 developed on the southwestern axis, where the main mass of the General Headquarters reserves was also being used. Eight of the ewly formed reserve armies, almost all the tank corps, the main mass of the tank brigades, and the artillery regiments were moved here. Six combined-arras armies and two tank armies, which had been newly formed in June toere also used on this axis. In the
Kay toa total ofivisions aboutifle brigades, andankechanized corps were committed to battle from the General Headquarters oASef^T* tnese' moreifle divisions, moreifle brigades,ankechanized,corps were on the southwestern axis.
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axes leading to these centers. Deeplte Colonel Mlkltenko's statement, wa consider that It is not at all necessarj for the axis of operations of tbe mala grouping of front or army ground troops to be directly dependent on the axis on which the nuclear weapons are concentrated.1 -Tho footnote la miaslng_7.
For example, it cannot be considered normal to direct the main efforts of tank armiesront to the side, let us say, of aarea for the sole reaaon that the main strike by missile troops Is directed there against the enemy's nuclear weapons. Xt is also impossible to use the basic mass of nuclear weaponseak enemy grouping Just because the main forcesront or army are operating on this axis. This leadsaste of nuclear weapons. Thus, at the operational game in1 both sidesup toercent of the nuclear warheads expended on the axes of the offensive by their basic groupingstheae strikes were not delivered against the main enemy forces. esult, the troops of both sides did not fulfil even their lmmeaiate tasks although they fireduclear warheads during the three days.
Xt le obvious thateeting engagement tbe basic efforts of the nuclear/missile weaponsront and of armies will be directed against the main enemy forces on axes which make it possible to come out in tbe shortest possible time ln the rear areas and flanks of his basic groupings and toward vitally important areas. The art of leading troops, apparently, will be nost clearly expressed when the enemy nuclear weapons and divisions are destroyed by massed nuclear/missile strikes and by our smaller forces connected from tbe front, but tbe main forces will be directed around or across the existing gape in tbe enemy's operational formation at speeds approaching thosearch. This will be possiblerouping of front (army) troops which Is stronger in its fire, strike, and maneuvering capabilities begins to operate in the meeting engagement on the axis of the main strike and if this grouping Is able touccessful offensiveroad zone which enaureB it the needed area for dispersion and mobility.
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Successeeting engagement does not depend onarge number of troops but on superiority of nuclear weapons and on their skillful use. In this connection, tbe problem about the role of superiority lo forces and weapons on the axis of the main strike in aengagement must be resolved primarily In favor of nuclear/ missile weapons. urprise nuclear strike against the basic enemy groupingatter of minutes may change the balance of forces and weapons.
It Is appropriate to stress here that modernmeans exclude the possibilityudden beginningeeting engagement of operational formations not only at the beginning but also during the wholeoperation. Here one sees still one more Important distinctive traiteeting engagement which has lost its uncertainty and quality of chance. In the past these were typical for this type of operation.
As is shown by experience, the planning and preparationeeting engagement in the initial periodar ia carried out during the preparation for the first offensive operation because the meeting engagement comprises its main and most crucial part. The following have considerable bearing on its preparation: more rigid conditions of secrecy and security during peacetime, the absenceet date for beginning the operation, restrictions ln conducting reconnaissance activities, and the organization of final operational troop formations.
En addition to the general preparation, while preparing to carry out the first operation it will be necessary toalso some specific problems Inherent in the organisationeeting engagement. Among these, first of all, are continuous reconnaissance and study of the enemy, determining the plan of the first meeting engagement in relation to the overall plan for the operation, determining the timing, the methods, and means of informing the troops of tbe tasks, and setting up launch sites and siting areas for missile troops
and airfields to base aircraft, taking into account tbe conduct of the impending meeting engagement. Tbeof troops la so organized that daring their advance it would be possiblehort period of tine to set up the needed grouping toeeting engagement. Setting up control points and communication centers and systems, organizing reliable aad timely warning, as well as screening the troops and objectives of the front (armies) by the antlalr defense (PVO) weapons of the country and the army troops' PVO, carrying out preparation of the terrain by engineer means, and the accumulation and distribution of supplies are all carried out subject to the accepted plan for the operation and tbe meeting engagement.
Operational training of the command and staffs and combat training of the troops are improved along specific lines but under conditions of keeping secret the real operational plans. All these preparatory measures are directly related to the first meeting engagement and demand centralized leadership and planned ezecutlon despite the opinions of some comrades who generally doubt the possibility of preparingeeting engagement in Tbe preparation of the first offensive operationbe detached or examined apart from its decisive actthe first meeting engagement. Of course, several measures will be carried outather prolonged period of time and will undergo many changes; however, the execution of the basic ones must conform to the requirements of ensuring constant troop combat readiness. Therein lies tbe peculiarity of the preparationeeting engagement ln peacetime.
One should dwell ln more detail on the contents of and the conditions underecision is made by tbeof the front troops. In several recent exercises and warrong approach toecision was observed, and its contents did not correspond to tboof tbe present. In our opinion, this occurred through the lack of thorough knowledge of combat equipment, foresight, and correct operational calculations 'which wouldalid evaluationituation and the makingonfldent operational decision.
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tne basis of Intelligence data during peacetime, it is necessary to scrutinize the plans and concept of the enemy, be veil versed In tbe capabilities of his nuclear/missile weapons, and foresee tbe quantitative and qualitative changes which mav occur In his groupings, ln the near future andore prolonged period of time. For Instance, at the present time an infantryof the US Army has an "Honest John" battery, andear there will be two or three of then. Moreover, the type ofapparently, will become different andimproved.
One must also consider the state of our troops at the present time and their capabilities in the future, the nature of operational training, and how It will change. All these circumstances force us to workecision for tbe first meeting engagement of the initial periodar, and this decision must meet the modern conditions of the situation and must contain elements of foresight for the near future. This decision must be free fromand must leave room for corrections to beinto It in accordance with the changes which occur.
In the decision about the meeting engagement, on tbe basis of thorough analysis and calculations one mustthe enemy's plan and grouping, primarily the location of his weapons of nuclear attack; the possible radiation situation; and the complement, state, and general task of our own troops and those of our neighbors, and the concept of our own decision. On the basis of the decision, one must fix the axis of tbe main strike and the main efforts of nuclear/missile weapons as well as the expected result from the nuclear strikes. The commander of the front troops and the commander of tbe army determine the tasks of nuclear/ missile weapons for the whole depth of the meeting engagement and by days allot nuclear warheads according to the tasks and among formations and large units, and they indicate the tasks for front and army weapons and the procedure forlarge units and units of missile troops.
Missile troops must receive in advance the needed data
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oq objectives to be destroyed by nuclear weapons and sust draw up tables and programs for launching missiles. Here formations and large units make provisions for variations in troop operations according to axes and times fortheir tasks ln coordination with missile troops, aircraft, and airborne forces, for routes of movement, and orientation areas for adjustment (regullrovaniye) and, rarely, lines of probable deployment. Later the tasks are determined for the airborne forces, areas are indicated for their landinghe tasks of aircraft and arms of troops are Indicated, and finally measures to ensure the meeting engagement and the organization of troop control are indicated.
In determining the tasks for armies and divisions, particularly for those assigned for operations in front and separated from tbe main forces, in some instances it will be advisable not to cut the zone of the offensive but to indicate the directions of the strikes, which enemyrouping to destroy, and which areas or objectives to eelxe and by what time.
Variations in the decision of the front troop commander for the destruction of tbe eaemyeeting engagement in the border zone must be made known to tbe commanders of armies and to the commanding officers of large unite in.
Particular attention must be given to organizingreconnaissance of the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack before the very beginning of the first meeting engagement, to covering one's own troops from the air, to protecting them from the weapons of mass destruction, and also toout effective radio countermeasures. It is veryto foresee the radiation situation which may ariseesult of tbe use of nuclear warheads by both sides and to work out variations of the plan for troop operationshorough and detailed calculation of this factor.
The preparation for the subsequent meeting engagement during the first offensive front operation apparently will
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during the execution of the preceding; one orwift advance of the main forces of the front and armies into the operational depth immediately after receiving the intelligence data about the advance of the enemy reserves, and it will be carried outinimum amount of time.
The decision to annihilate the advancing enemy grouping is made and relayed to the subordinates in advance so that the troops willhance toaneuverto the given mission and goal of the forthcoming: meeting engagement, to deliver nuclear/missile and aircraft strikes against enemy groupings, and to forestall their makingecision should take literally no moreew hours, and in this the commander and the chief of staff will work jointly. The execution of the adopted decision must be based on the highest degree of creativeand independence of commanding officers on all levels.
The grouping of the troops of the front and the armies will depend mainly on the tasks being executed by the missile troops of strategic designation for the front. The possibility of simultaneously destroying the resisting onemy along the entire depth of his operational formation makes it possible to perform the taskseeting engagementingle echelon operational formation. ormation ensures the most correct use of nuclear/misslie weapons, aircraft, airborne forces, and the tank and mechanized troops of the front and army for the most effective exploitation of the results of-nuclear/missile strikes.
It is obvious that the efforts of the front troopseeting engagement can be intensified by
thestrikes followed by a. swift advance of tank and motorized rifle divisions or by combat operations of airborne forces. Reserve divisions, capable of advancingide front will be found more frequently within an operational formation (on the'basis of the experience of operational exercisesfour to sisin the front and one to two divisions In the army) than as second echelons ln the form of large operational formations. Conditions requiring the formation of troop
groupings of tbe front and the armies for the first and subsequent neetlng engagements may vary considerably. In some Instances troop groupings are organized during the process of bringing up large units from disposition areas to tbe axes designated to them, ln others by bringing up the troops from concentration areas upon combat alert. It becomes especially important'to maintain the constantcombat readiness of the troops and their ability to start combat operations immediately upon combat alert. The troops must be able to cross or bypass areas ofand zones of radioactive contamination and must be excellently preparedwift forward movementpeeday and more.
eeting engagement is organized during an operation, the forming of troop groupings of tbe front and the armies will be determined by the operational situation of the troops and the actual circumstances. Bowever, it can be assumed that under these conditions it' will be necessary toaneuver first of all by the trajectories of large units and units of missile troops; also to effect some regrouping of the large units of ground troops, and to commit to battle large units of reserves or of the second echelon if the latter is designated.
During the preparationeeting engagementImportance is attached to the timely organization and support of the march of large units. Under moderntbe process of moving the troops forward isby the increased depth of the march columns of the large units. To retain freedom of mobility, one must move as far as possible roader front, and this favors the rapid execution of the march and deployment of troops. In this instance, it is easier to organize the antlat6mic defense of troops and to conceal them from enemy Units and large units become less vulnerable to air strikes. road front of movement creates greatto seize and bypass the enemy's flanksi
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Considering the density of the road network in the main
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theater of military operations and the demands for anti-atomic defense of troops on the march, it has beenthat three or four roadsodern motorized rifle or tank division can be guaranteed without particular difficulty. In the practice of exercises of recentivision was allotted no more than two routes although it was known that the depthivision's column with measures to safeguard it on two routes reachedm. Incidentally, inivision along three and four routes, the depth of its columns will be accordinglyndm. Hero, if the situation permits, tank large units and units should be /led along lj separate routes orroutes (kolonnyy put). ovement forwardank division has been confirmed in the exercisein9 in the Ckraine where the tank division moved forward froa the concentration area by four routes. The advisable combination of width of front ln moving troops forward with echeloning them in depth shouldimely accumulation of forces able ton enemy grouping in the entire depth of its operational formation.
The coordination of troops in the first meetingwas expressed most clearly in the decision adopted on the basis of calculations worked out in detail. Obviously, the most tense and crucial moment in organizing coordination will be before the very beginning of the meeting engagement when In limited amounts of time and sometimes even during the movement forward of troops the command must define ln greater detail the tasks of formations and large units and the periods of their fulfilment which were established earlier. For this, during peacetime one must be tireless ln working out in practice the methods for organizingin various and most critical variations and bringing great improvement in the level of the skills of generals.and senior officers. The main task consists of ensuring the coordinated use of nuclear weapons ln combination with other weapons of combat, achieving the'greatestof nuclear strikes, and using their results by troops
Ia tho process of working out this coordination, it is important to achieve harmony of missile troops, of formations and large units of ground troops and aviation, arms of troops, and special troops. Simultaneously therebe worked out practical methods to reestablishwblch has been destroyed during the engagement. Tbe practice of operational training ln peacetime, particularly work on organizing coordination at exercises, must have as its goal on the one band tbe checking of individual problems and calculations which are close to the real solutioneeting offensive operation and its first meeting engagement and, on the other band, teaching commanders, commanding officers, and staffs both in theory and practice the methods of making the needed calculations and the specific solution of all problems of coordination, mainly on the map. In our opinion,esult oftudy, during peacetime it is quite possible to .work out tho most approximate variations of troop coordination for the first day and in general terms for the subsequent period of the first meeting engagement.
The reader say have noticed that so far nothing has been said about the plan ot tbe operation. Actually, we do not consider it necessary to developlaneeting offensive operation because the decision expressed on the map and based on the necessary calculations is, ln Itself, the plan. Neither is there any need tothe decision in other documents, ln particular in the plan to use nuclear weapons and in other plans to employ arms ofecause the above matter comprises the
essence of the commander's decisioneeting engagement.
Troop controleeting engagement during the initial periodar must be such as to ensure efficient and maximal use of ail the forces and weapons of the front and the army to seize the initiativehort period of time and to achieve the ultimate goal of the engagement. Tbe natureeeting engagement decisivelykillful combination of centralized and decentralized methods of troop control. It is important for the commander of an army
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1IBON6ARKJ
and tbe commanding officerarge unit to know tbe plan of tbe senior commanding officer and how he expects the meeting engagement to develop so that they will act with Initiative and freely in accordance with the developing situation ln order to fulfil promptly their task within the limits of the front or army operation. In our opinion, decentralization of control creates highly favorablefor exhibiting initiative.
Under modern conditions the control ofeeting engagement will become considerably more complicated, te should even admit the possibility that control points vlll be put out of action more frequently. To ensure uninterrupted control of troops, nowreater degree than before there is needhorough understanding of the nature of meeting engagements ln the initial periodar and knowledge of the new means of combat. The proximity of the control points to the troops, smooth operation of all typos of communications, and also the availability of reserve forces and means of communications all have an Important bearing on stability of control.
The complex and sharply changing situation at the very beginning of and during meeting engagements demands that the commanders of the front and army troops be constantly awaro of and react Immediately to any changesituation, be ready toew decision without delay, and to clarify or assign additional tasks to the troops. It is most to be constantly informed about the capabilities either side may have for using nuclear weapons, the condition and position of one's own troops in areas of nuclear bursts, the radiation levels in these areas, and the capabilities of the troops to carry on further combat operations; to take Into account the nature of work in eliminating the effects of the enemy's nuclear attack, and several other facts on the actual situation stemming from massed use ofweapons.
Experience indicates that without the use of soundselective communications, automatic scramblingduplicating and electronic machines as well as facsimile telegraphy and television it is impossible to make
.f
IIBQN6ABK)
any substantial changes in the work profile of the staffs. However, by resolving only technical problems It is impossible toistinct improvement in troop control. combat performance of the troops will dependreat extent on the knowledge, skill, and organizational work of the command and the staffs both In preparation^or andeeting engagement.
All this will become possible when vital measures to organize control and communications are Implemented in border districts during peacetime. It is not necessary to assert here that exercising direction of combat operations of troops from areas where the staffs are located during peacetime is excluded. In our opinion, to ensure firmness of control It is necessary to have in each formation ofcombat readiness two independent control points which are capable of taking troop control completely on themselves under the appropriate conditions of the situation. As is known, modern command and forward command posts do notthis problem because right now ln the practice of exercises it is only in those places where the commander is located that one finds completely equipped forces and means of control. Incidentally, If one does not prepare equal control points which can replace each other during peacetime, one cannot count on continuity of control even during the first hours of the initial periodar.
It is advantageous toeeting engagement with massed powerful strikes by missiles and front aviation (in the appropriate situation and with the participation of heavy rocket artillery) with an extensive use of nuclear and chemical weapons. Preemptive nuclear strikes have as their aim tbe breaking up of the enemy deployment which has begun, of inflicting significant losses on him and separating his groupings into units, of destroying his coordination, and of disorganizing his control. The timely, accurate, and swift delivery of these strikes will ensure that the commander of troops of the front can eeize and maintain the Initiative
aod that it willecisive influence on the successful development of coabat operations.
With tbe skillful use of the results of tbe nuclear strikes, tank and motorized rifle divisions and airborne forces, moving at high speed to tbe depth and operating from the flanks and the rear, complete the destruction of enemy groupings. Strong advance guards, forward detachments, and airborne forces must forestall the enemy ln seizingareas and crossings on wide water barriers and must not allow him to throw bis troops in an organized manner- into tbe engagement.
It would be naive to think, however, that in aof an imminent meeting engagement the enemy would wait until nuclear strikes had been delivered against him or would be forestalled in deployment and shift to the offensive. Even if the enemy delays in deploying his troops or temporarily shifts to the defensive, even in this Instance he will be able at any time tourprise nuclear strike against our troops. Thus, the threat of an enemy nuclear attack during the meeting engagement does not have an episodic natureonstant one.
Recently, ln several exercises calculations have been made on the destruction by nuclear weapons of whole units and subunits. Some textbooks and military literature also give variations of calculations according to which there isthe needed amount of nuclear warheads to Inflict serious losses on the enemy (upexcent) . In the majority of Instances, these calculations represent atransfer of old methods forideow situation and scarcely suit future engagements. One cannot Imagine an enemy who would locate troops ln an operational formation and battle formations ln the open, and we would have no difficulty in revealing them completely and determining clearly tbe ground zeros for bursts and the optimumfor ammunition. One thing is sure: yie *ost Important enemy objectives which are discovered must be destroyed. With the development of the meeting engagement and theln the speed of movement, consideration must be given
I
I
not only to the unimpeded forward movement. but also to the enemy's stubborn resistance and to the need to clear the. way for troops both by conventional weapons of destruction and by nuclear weapons.
Here nuclear woapons cannot bo usedethod of artillery offenslvo as was observed at some exercises in the winter. Within the front and tho army nucloar woapons must bc used against such enemy objectives as operational-tactical weaponn nnd depots of nucleardelivery aircraft at airfields, control point.-, troop groupings in tho depth, on tho march and during deployncnt. road Junctions, and water crossings. ooting engage ment nucloar strikes may alno be delivered against the enemy operating against advancing divisions, but this must bc carried out by the divinions. first of all by tacticaland taking into account their own approaching troops and certainly notingle battalion or an "Honest JOhn" installation, butollective targot (gruppo-vaya tsel) .
Artillery and fighter-bomber aircraft with conventional and chemical ammunition and also tanks can bo usodto destroy tho enemy's tactical weapons of attack (missiles of tho "Honest John" and "Lacrosse" typo) on the battlefield.
Following the nucloar strikes, the largo unite operating from the front break into the intervals between the columns or combat formations of the enemy from the march, broak up and annihilate them by units, andlannedof the enemy's main forces.
Deployment of the first ectac)ivisions of the armies depends on the situation and, primarily, on the composition of the enemy groupings and the nature of their operations. It is advisable only for destroying the wain enemy groupingstrike at tlie flank or the roar (bearing i" mind that tbe more infrequently tho divisions arc deployed for combat, the higher will bo tho spood of the offensive ). Forward detachments and divisions of the first echelon oi ttu- armies
-2G-
should not be brought ln to deal with splintered nits and isolated centers of enemy resistance; it is recommended that units and large units from the reserves or the second echelons be detailed to destroy them.
eeting engagement each division must be ready to make an abrupt change in the direction of the strike and to be deployed to the side of tbe flank in order to combine its efforts with its neighbors. Troops advancing from the front or from the flanks must reach the areas of airborne landing operations as quickly as possible.
During the executionaneuver, the divisions must not be sent through zones of radioactive contaminationfirst determining their width, depth, and level of At the exercises and war games0umber of cases this requirement was overlooked. After tbe divisions crossed zones of radioactive contamination with high levels of radiation or after theyassed nuclear strike, they continued to participate in theas though nothing had happened to them. rimitive approach to these exercises is intolerable because the troops become accustomed to Ignoring important specific factorsodern situation.
Tbe first nuclear strikes and the swift offensive by the divisions should inflict losses on the enemy which cannot be mad9 up easily, ensure seizure of the initiative and attainmentigh speed of advance, destroy important operational staffs and communication centers, and disrupt operation of railroad junctions and highways. The decisive operations of our troops must deprive the enemy of the possibility of inflicting losses on the advancing large units with his nuclear weapons, andesult of that he will be forced to give up the offensive.
onduct of the first meeting engagement must have the result that by the end of the first day the main enemy groupings in the border zone will ,be broken up, and combat operations will be transferred to the operational depth. By
27
II RON (UftK
moving forward swiftly, tho tank army and the tank divisions cf the combined-arms armies may find themselves undervhen from the very beginning of the Meetingon the axis of their operations the enemy will offer insignificant resistance. Inituation commanders of formations and commanding officers of large units first of all will take measures to force the march of divisions, to move troopsoncentrated manner, and to ensure constant control. Simultaneously, tbe aircraft and antiaircraft cover of the troops will be Intensified, and the enemy's control of his missiles and aircraft will be disrupted by intensive jamming. Taking into consideration that the enemy may quickly send his reserves against the divisions which are moving foi*-ward freely, it is important to use the favorable conditions as quickly and effectively as possible. Simultaneously, one must direct the efforts of reconnaissance to discovering the maneuvers of the enemy's reserves and his missile troops and aircraft, and airborne forces must be used to hamper their movement forward.
Taking into consideration the possible large gap of our
own troops from the remaining forces of the front, the staffs
of formations and large units must be particularly careful in
controlling their position on the march, guarantee thorough
reconnaissance for the troops, organize protection of the
flanks, and support reliable communications between the
columns and the coordinating staffs moving ln the center of
the marcn oraer of the formation or large unit.
The basic forces of the missile troops and frontare used for tbe groupings wblch are moving forward swiftly and for their operations ln Isolation from thetroops of the front if this is possible. Theof troops of the front must be ready to reinforce the operations of the troops with nuclear/missilo strikes and by throwing ln forces and weapons of reinforcement as well as fuel and ammunition by air. Simultaneously, he will direct the efforts ct other troop groupings for the very rapidof the opposing enemy anfl for the swift arrival in art>as the occupation of which ensures reliable operational coordination with the front groupings operatingforward
1
and also with troops of the neighboring fronts. The de-
?.TZt ^completing the rapid destruction of the enemy
lic.lly?perationS of the tank armies and tankof the combined-arms
7TIthat thS eneny wlU tryefense on water lines
lolteasures belaE prepared by the enemy is a
underuccessfully executed onlj
situation condi"onsonstant and rapid analysis of the
llll or H ed "devaluation of it, and also of operational foresight.
ecision, one must consider the conditions ?Lagainst strong enemy groupings. In operational training there are instances of ! nd during an engagementIS" JMto rapldof nuclear warheads ment tnemcritical moments of the engage-
be commanders ofeakening of troop operations in Hit 11 An increase in ac5levodby skillful maneuver of nuclear
IrtnXrvnd^SUCnd Hlso by ^rcraf? and weaned Lill dreserves and forces and
^nen3^ transDOrt "iation and helicopters rose"eseeting engagement may de-
PerJodeithe 8ltua"on ln our favor in the shortest period of timeertain sector or axis. However the actual capabilities do not allow us to count on Urge-scale use of these weapons in the very near future.
j _ _J* tbe verv beginningeeting engagement or during
cria^dao ^RiSual axis maytt d n control orthe factew unitsarge unit is put out of action by enemy massed
29
Tensas*
nuclear strikes. The scope of the enemy's probable nuclear strike can be gauged by the following data: at the NATO troops1 exercisest was planned to use overuclear warheads toassed strike against thetroops of only one army. The result of such strikes mayharp change ln the balance of forces in favor of the enemyiven axis. It is necessary to be ready for such acute critical momentseeting engagement. To preventituation,eeting engagement, tbe commanders of the operational formations and their staffs must forestall the enemy in all his operations by tbemeasures: continuously conduct reconnaissance of tbe enemy's nuclear weapons and effectively combat the disclosed missile weapons and aircraft; always ensure dispersed leader* ship of large units and units; be informed about the radiation situation in all instances and organize by-passes orof areas of radioactive contamination; ensure open flanks by thorough reconnaissance and by availabllty ofwhich are in echelon formation behind tho troopsalong the threatened axis; and constantly build up troop effectivenessarge-scale maneuver by forces and weapons and be capable of effecting quick regroupings.
Swift operations at high speed of tank and combined-arms formations and large units following nuclear strikes, deep envelopment of the flanks of main groupings, and extensive use of airborne landings will assure success ln achieving the alms- of the front and the army eeting engagement during the Initial periodar.
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Original document.
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